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CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENCE: CONCURRENT LIABILITY ? 
This paper endeavours to formulate an answer to the issue of 
whether there should be concurrent liability in contract and in 
tort for the negligent breach of a contract. It is clear that 
there will be liability in contract, but when should it be possible 
for an alternative action in tort to succeed? 
possible solutions to the problem: 
There are three 
(1) there should be no liability in tort if the negligence 
complained of is connected with the performance of a contract, and 
breaches that contract . 
(2) there should be liability in tort where the right of action 
between the parties exists independently although arising out of t~e 
relationship brought about by the contract; 
(3) there should be liability in tort for every negligent breach 
of a contractu~i obligation. 
This paper will look briefly at the practical significance of 
this problem and,after making a conceptual analysis, will examine the 
judicial response to the issue. A discussion of the issue in regard 
to negligent mis-statements is postponed until the last part of the 
paper because of the differences in character it possesses from the 
tort for negligent acts. 
Practical Significance 
The problem is not purely academic, for in many cases it is 
advantageous to sue in tort rather than in contract. For instance 
the question of remoteness of damages differs according to whether 
the claim is in tort or in contract. "The modern rule of tort is 
quite different and it imposes a much wider liability."!. Al though 
the period of statutory limitation is the same for actions in both 
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contract and tort the causes of action may nevertheless accrue at 
different times. In contract the cause of action accrues when a 
term is breached, but in tort it does not accrue until actual loss 
occurs. This means that the damage must have become evident. 2 
Thus an action in contract cannot succeed six years after the breach, 
but an action in tort may still succeed if it is less than six years 
since the damage became evident. 
Other differences may occur in the actual measure of damages, 3 
or upon the application of the Contributory Negligence Act, 4 or if 
the facts reveal a conflict of laws situation necessitating the 
service of a writ out of the jurisdiction. 5 
This brief review of the varying consequences of framing the 
action in contract or tort is by no means definitive, and a fuller 
exposition of the differences can be found in other commentaries 6 but 
is not necessary here. They have been mentioned simply to show the 
practical significance of this topic. 
Conceptual Analysis 
The distinction between contract and tort turns on the origin of 
the duty. In the contract the duty arises from the agreement of the 
parties; in tort it is independent of the agreement and is imposed 
upon the parties by law. It is the contention of this paper that an 
action in tort should succeed when the negligent act complained of 
breaches that duty imposed by the law and that the presence of a 
contract should not defeat this actim1 unless there are contractual 
terms which preclude liability for negligence. 
To establish liability in tort for negligence it must be shown 
that there was a breach of a legal duty to take care. A legal duty 
3 
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to take care requires that a person must take reasonable care to avoid 
acts or omissions which he can reasonably forsee woulJ be likely to 
injure persons who are so closely and directly affected by the act or 
omission that he ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as 
being so affected when he is directing his mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question. If the careless act was 
accompanied by these requisite elements an action in tort negligence 
should succeed. This should be so both when the right of action is 
established external to any contractual relationship and when the 
right of action arises out of a contractual relationship. 7 In the 
latter case it can be said that the tort duty exists independently of 
the contract, although arising out of the relationship brought about 
by the contract, and the word "independently" is used in this limited 
sense throughout this paper. Nevertheless, there is one case wh'ere 
an independent duty in tort cannot arise out of a contractual 
relationship. If the act complained of is one connected with the 
performance of the contract and the contract contains terms explicitly 
excluding the parties' liability for negligence, or the consequences 
of their acting negligently, an action in tort negligence should not 
succeed. If a contract contained an exemption clause excluding 
liability for negligence the clause would be rendered ineffective, if 
it were possible to succeed in an alternative claim in tort negligence. 
In fact, no such alternative claim is allowed, so that contractual 
terms can in some cases deny an alternative remedy in tort. This is 
consonant with the fundamental principle, freedom of contract. If an 
alternative action in tort were able to succeed despite contractual 
terms altering the legal obligations, parties would no longer be able 
to adjust their legal duties by mutual agreement in the form of a 
contract. It should be mentioned that this is already the case where 
the contract is contrary to public pollcy. 
• 
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It has been mooted by some jurists that our legal system would be 
more consistent if every careless act that breached a contractual 
8 obligation also incurred a liability in tort. It is submitted that 
this cannot be accepted as long as value is seen in maintaining separate 
doctrines of contract and tort. If the contractual obligation should 
become a duty in tort present differences between the consequences 
flowing from the separate doctrines could no longer be maintained. 
Historical Perspective 
Negligence as a moJc of breaching a contract has always been 
recognized, but before 1932 an action alleging negligence had to be 
founded on contract, or constitute a mode of committing certain other 
torts (e.g. trespass or nuisance), before liability could ensue. 
In 1932 the decision of the House of Lords, Donoghue v Stevenson, 9 
treated negligence, where there was a duty to take care, as a specific 
tort in itself, and not simply an element in some more complex 
relationship, or in some specialized breach of duty. With the 
development of an independent tort of negligence that applied to all 
people, concurrent liability for a negligent act in a contractu(al 
situation became far more likely. 
Prior to Donoghue v Stevenson it was possible for a plaintiff to 
succeed alternatively in contract or tort for negligent acts, if the 
f f 1 f 11 . 10 de endant was a ol ower o· a common ea 1ng. The liability in tort 
was not purely by reason of the fact that the defendant had carelessly 
breached a contractual obligation. 
established by the def~odant's status. 
A legal duty in tort was 
Historically, the under lying 
11 theory of the common callings cases was one of pure tort; that the 
defendant had deceived the plaintiff by falsely representing that he 
was skilled in his trade. From this developed the doctrine of 
assumpsit, or the undertak.ing of the defendant to serve the plaintiff, 
• 
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which in turn developed into the doctrine of contract. Nevertheless 
the tortious duty persisted upon people engaged in conunon callings. 
The followers of these common callings were subject to liabilities 
that arose not out of an agreement but rather from their status and 
from the idea that it was in the interests of the community that 
people who offered their services to the public at large should show 
care, skill and honesty in their dealings. 
I th H f d d . . 12 . n e ouse o Lor s ec1s1on Brown v Boorman 1n 1844 the 
plaintiff set out his cause of action in tort against a stockbroker 
for the failure to 1->er{urm a contractufal duty. The defendant 
argued, inter alia, that the proper cause of action was in contract 
and therefore the plaintiff must fail. However it was held that; 
"Where there is a contract and something to be done in the course 
of employment which is the subject of that contract, if there is 
a breach of duty in the course of that employment the plaintiff 
13 may recover in either tort or cont qi.et.'' 
At first sight thls would appear to constitute every negligent 
breach of a contract as a tort. It must be noted, however, that 
14 firstly, it was pointed out in the Court of Exchequer Chamber from 
whose decision the appeal was brought, that the stockbroker belonged 
to a profession which was a common calling. If the House of Lords 
decision was not made within the context of the law pertaining to 
common callings it can still be explained on other grounds indicated 
. 15 
in the Judgement. The potential damages to be awarded in Brown v 
Boorman were the same, whether the action was framed in contract or 
tort. As there was no conflict in consequences the instant case 
could hardly result in the assimilation of contract and tort with regard 
to negligence. The real basis for the decision then could have been 
the point that the plaintiff should not be defeated where there is a 
• 
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good cause of action but an incorrectly drafted statement of claim . 
Since Brown v Boorman those trades and professions known as the 
common callings have in most cases continued to be labelled as such 
thus retaining a concurrent liability in contract and tort for 
negligence. When dealing with cases involving common callings the 
courts have had no hesitation, where the act complained of breached a 
contractual obligation, in allowing an alternative action in tort to 
succeed where an independent legal duty in tort was established, 
16 With the decision of Donoghue v Stevenson and the development 
of the independent tort of negiigence, concurrent liability became a 
significant issue, Consistent with the preceding authority and the 
contention of this paper, concurrent liability was envisaged in 
circumstances where the newly developed tort of negligence was shown 
to exist. 
"The fact that there is a contractual relatior~spip betweeq tl'le 
parties which may give rise to an action for breach of contract, 
does not exclude the co-existence of a right of action founded 
on negligence as between the parties, independently of the 
contract, though arising out of the relationship in fact brought 
17 about by the contract." 
However, since Donoghue v Stevenson there has been some authority 
holding that, except in the cases involving common callings, although 
a legal duty in tort could be established, liability was contractual 
only, if the act complained of was connected with the performance of 
a contract, This authority has chiefly been concerned with cases 
involving professio,ials. Before thos~ cases are considered, an outline 
of some of the strong authority since Donoghue v Stevenson favouring 
concurrent liability where there is an independent legal duty in tort 
arising out of a contractual relationship, is given. 
8 
Authority since Donoghue v Stevenson 
Concurrent liability was again recognized by the House of Lords in 
1957 in the case of Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co.
18 
where 
it was held that servants under a contr e t of employment may sue for 
negligence in both contract and tort where an independent legal duty in 
tort is established. In Jackson v Mayfair Window Cleaning Co. 19 
Barry J. held that a window cleaner, who negligently performed a contract, 
was liable in the tort of negligence. It was specifically noted that 
there had to be an independent legal duty in tort present and that a 
negligent breach of a contractual obligation did not necessarily 
constitute the breach of a legal duty in tort. 
"The plaintiff does not complain of mere non feasance nor does she 
say that the defendants failed to clean the chandelier at the 
time or in the manner stipulated by their contract. Her case 
is based on a broader duty independent of any contractural 
20 obligation undertaken by the defendants." 
In New Zealand Jackson v Mayfair Window Cleaning Co.was followed 
C . k . d 21 by the Supreme ourt 1n Buxton v Mc enz1e an Anor. A builder,under 
a contract of employment, installed a destructor and range unit in the 
kitchen of the plaintiff's dwelling house. The house was destroyed 
by fire, caused by these installations, more than six years after the 
execution of the contract. This case decided the preliminary 
question of law as to whether the statement of claim showed a cause of 
action in view of the Statute of Limitations. If the alleged 
negligence was contractu.al only then the action was statute barred 
but if liability was in tort,where the caus e of action did not accrue 
until the fire, less than six years before the trial, then that action 
would not be statute barred. Henry J. in a considered judg/ment 
held that if a breach of a leg a l duty could be e~ tablished,although 
arising from the contractual relationship, an alternative action in 
•· 
,. 
9 
tort could succeed. 
It was once thought that a builder-owner was liable to a purchaser 
in contract only for negligence. But the leading case in this area
2 2 
h . h 1 1 · d 23 f upon w 1c ater cas e s re 1e , was decided be ore Donoghue v Stevenson 
and the development of the independent tort of negligence. The 
proposition was overruled by a majority in the English Court of Appeal 
in Dutton v Bognar Regis Urban District Counci1
24 
where it was held 
tnat the fact that the builder was also the owner did not affect his 
liability in tort. A si~ilar issue arose in tne Ne~ Ze~l~qd ~uprem~ 
I 
spld land, which was once a refuse tip site, for ho4siqg, Tpey qao 
negligently failed to compress the land sufficiently so that damage 
resulted to the house of a purchaser. 
was liable in both tort and contract. 
It was held that the Council 
The decision which was based 
26 on Dutton v Bognar Regis Urban District Council, but dealt with 
slightly different facts, admitted concurr e nt liability against a 
developer (the council), who was also an owner. This decision has 
now been vindicated by the English Court of Appeal decision Batty v 
Me tropolitan 
27 
Property Realisation Ltd. In that cas e , because of 
negligent surveying of a building site by a development company, a 
house was constructed on land that would subside within ten years, 
making the house valueless. The plaintiffs who had purchased a 
long term lease sued in both contract and tort for negligence. 
Megaw L.J. held that they could succeed in both actions, and that in 
h i s view with regard to denying liability in tort where there was an 
independent legal duty there could be "no reason, in logic or on 
practical grounds for putting any such limitation on the scope of the 
. ht" 28 rig • 
To summarize then: authority,not conc erned with the liability of 
professionals,clearly supports the contention of this paper. There 
I 
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should be a liability in tort where the right of action exists 
independently of the contract, although arising out of the contractual 
relationship, but not every negligent breach of contract constitutes a 
right of action in tort. 
Professionals 
In some cases dealing with professionals, courts have denied 
liability in tort wherever the act complained of was connected with 
the performance of a contract. It must now be considered whether 
this stance is justifiable. Recovery for negligent breach of contract 
in contract only, does not apply to all the professions. Those 
labelled as common callings are still subject to concurrent liability. 
It seems that the courts have labelled as cormnon callings those 
professions where negligent performance will cause physical injury or 
loss.Liability in tort, as well as contract, has b~en qelq to e~i~t iQ 
the case of physicians, surgeons, nurses, radio~raphers aQd 4eptists.
29 
But ·where the prospect of physical injury is less likely or qbsent 
there is authority to the effect that the duty to exercise skill is 
30 31 1· . 32 only contractural as with architects, stockbrokers and so 1c1tors. 
33 . h f Until Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd., wit ew 
exceptions, there could be no liability in tort at all for pure 
financial loss. The assumption underlying the courts' policy was 
that to allow recovery for pure financial loss would mean multiplicity 
of litigation producing an unfair burden on the defendant. For 
instance, a negligent mis-statement by u stockbroker could influence 
many to enter unwise investments causing much financial loss, whereas 
if the damage was of a physical nature it was unlikely to occur more 
than once, and could usually be remedi ed before further injury could 
occur. Until Hedley Byrne the courts thought that if they admitted 
liability in tort for negligence which caused financial loss in a 
cont r actual situation, they would also be bound to allow liability in 
• 
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tort for negligence causing financial loss outside of a contractual 
relationship. The courts could see no way of limiting the tortious 
duty determined by the wide-reaching foreseeability principle. 
The courts could not invoke the contract as a limiting device as this 
method had been condemned in Donoghue v Stevenson. So the courts 
held that there was no duty in tort owed to the plaintiff for 
professional undertakings that, if performed negligently, would cause 
pure economic loss. However, in 1964 the House of Lords decision 
Hedley Byrne allowed, in principle,recovery for financial loss caused 
by a professional's negligent mis-statement. This liability 
depended on a special relationship, the limiting device the courts 
had been seeking. This relationship is considered in detail later. 
Here it is sufficient to say that as a general rule, where a professional 
undertakes work for another party who, he knows, is relying on his 
expertise a duty of care arises. 34 
. Thus unti 1 Hedley Byrne there was no legal tort duty for 
negligence imposed upon professionals who were likely to cause 
economic loss. Therefore there could be no concurrent liability. 
But the Hedley Byrne decision established a legal duty in tort for 
such professionals thus opening the way for concurrent liability. 
However, some judges have continued to deny concurrent liability. 
Authority Concerning Professionals since Hedley Byrne 
Clark v Kirby-Smith gS 
In this case the defendant solicitors failed to apply for a new 
tenancy, so that when the plaintiffs• option to renew the lease 
expired they were served notice. The plaintiffs claimed damages for 
the sum of dilapidations which they were obliged to pay on the 
termination of the old lea ~e, and damages for the cost of negotiating 
the settlement of claim for the dilapidations. Those damages were 
12 
thought to be only recoverable in tort. In the result Plowman J. 
found that the above-mentioned damages could not be recovered at law. 
Nevertheless, he held that the liability of a solicitor to his client 
for negligence was a liability in contract only. The plaintiffs 
argued that Hedley Byrne had established liability for professionals, 
such as lawyers, in the tort of negligence and that therefore there 
could be no logical reason for denying a tortious remedy in a 
contractual situation. Plowman J. disagreed, holding that a "line 
of cases going back for nearly 150 years shows, I think, that the 
36 client's cause of action is in contract not tort," and that Hedley 
Byrne did not affect this authority. Out surely this is incorrect. 
Th h . h P 1 1 . d 3 7 f 1 . . e cases upon w 1c owman J. re 1e had ound that so 1c1tors were 
not followers of common callings, and were therefore obliged to find 
liability in contract only as there was no liabilfty ip to+t. The 
,e~Jey Byrne decision established~ liapility in tort w~ere prev i ously 
I 
there had been none, thus admitting the possibility of concurrent 
liability. It is also questionable whether the decisions upon which 
Plowman J. relied were justified in finding that solicitors were not 
f 1 f 11 . 38 ol owers o a common ea 1ng. It was once clearly the case that 
solicitors were followers of a common calling and therefore concurrently 
liable. (see Russell v Palmer (1767)2 Wils 325) In Nocton v 
Lord Ashburton
39 
in 1914 there is also dictum to the effect that a 
solicitor- client relationship could be subject to a concurrent 
liability. That solicitors were no longer regarded as members 0£ a 
common calling was no doubt indirectly caused by the abandonment of the 
privity of contract doctrine in Donoghue v Stevenson to limit liability 
in tort. Its replacement by the foreseeability principle was 
probably considered too far-reaching with regard to economic loss. 
Suffice it to say, the two foundations of Plowman J's decision, 
that solicitors are not followers of a common calling and that 
1 
Hedley Byrne has not affected their liability are both highly 
questionable. 
Bagot v Stevens1Scan1an & Co.
40 
13 
In this case architects negligently supervised the laying of drains 
with the result that several of the drainage pipes ruptured causing 
damage. The action involved the issue of limitations as the damage 
occured more than six years after the completion of the contract so 
that the plaintiffs could only succeed in tort. Diplock J. stated: 
"It seems to me that ,in this case, the relationship which created 
the duty of exercising reasonable skill and care by the architects 
to their clients arose out of the contract and not otherwise. 
The complaint that is made against them is of a failure to do the 
very thing they contracted to do. That was the relationship 
which gave rise to the duty which was broken. It was a 
contractual relationship, a contractual duty, and any action 
brought fer failure to comply with this duty is in my view, an 
· action founded upon contract alone. 1141 
What Diplock J. is saying is, that once the parties have taken the 
trouble to express their relationship in contractual terms, they do not 
intend to be regulated by the more general law. It is submitted that 
this attributed intention goes too far, attaching undue precedence to 
contract. When Bagot v Stevens,Scanlan & Co.was decided it was 
already clear that an architect was liable to third parties for 
42 
negligent supervision of construction resulting in physical damage. 
It is unlikely that a party who has given consideration intends to put 
himself in a worse position than some third party who has not. In 
essence, Diplock J's proposition means that where the act complained 
of breaches a contract that act can only attract liability in contract, 
even if it breaches other legal duties. This is to say that the 
presence of a contract displaces liability in tort negligence not in 
• 
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specific terms but by implication with its mere presence. The duty 
of care in tort for negligent acts is not assumed voluntarily but 
imposed. It should no t be sufficient to found a relationship on a 
contractual basis and thereby preclude liability in tort when a duty 
in tort is breached, Such a stance cannot be supported in theory or 
by authority. In cases where followers of common callings have 
attempted to preclude liability for negligent acts in tort the courts 
have strictly construed such contractual clauses requiring that they 
~3 be in explicit and precise terms. The grounds for this decision are 
incompatible with the cases previously outlined including those cases 
dealing with common 1.,allings which allowed concurrent liability • 
Another issue dealing with similar principles arose in the House of 
Lords decision Billings (A.C.) & Sons v Riden. 44 In that case 
contractors attempted to avoid liability in tort by claiming their 
legal dµties were governed by the law relating to liceGsor aqd li c ensee 
wpiq1 wp.~ tqe rel'i'H<1nsnip b~tween t he contrp.c;tprs and tpa plaiqt.iff, 
It was held that liability in tort could not be precluded merely by the 
presence of a licensor,licensee relationship. 
Diplock J.,as did Plowman J. in Clark v Kirby Smith,
45
supported 
his proposition by referring to authorities where in fact a finding of 
concurrent liability could not be permitted as no legal duty in tort 
existed. They were cases involving professionals, decided before 
46 Hedley Byrne, and cases not involving followers of common callings, 
",, '1 before Donoghue v Stevenson. Diplock J. also referred to the case of 
Jarvis v Moy,Davies & co48 decided in 1936 which involved the liability 
of stockbrokers for the negligent performance of a contract. The 
stockbrokers were held to be liable in contract alone. This would 
49 appear to be inconsistent with the decision of Brown v Boorman. 
However, the case was concerned with the question of whether the action 
was one"founded on a contract" or "founded on a tort"for the purposes 
of the Country Court Act 1919, a question in which it was well 
established that what had to be regarded was the substance of the 
matter even though there might be alternative liabilities. 50 The 
County Court Act (now repealed) further exacerbated the concurrent 
liability issue by requiring a compulsory dichotomy of the contract 
15 
and tort action when ascertaining court costs. For this reason the 
legislature should be assigned some share in the blame for the apparent 
conceptual inconsistencies promoted by some courts. 
51 Midland Bank Trust Co v Hett,Stubbs & Kemp. 
In this case a firm of solicitors negligently failed to register 
an option to purchase a farm as an estate contract. More than six 
years after the completion of the contract the owner of the farm 
conveyed it to his wife with the intention of defeating the option. 
Following a largely unsuccessful action against the owner, the 
prospective purchaser sued his solicitors, alleging negligence in tort. 
It was held that this alternative action in tort could succeed and that 
it was not statute barred because the cause of action did not accrue 
until damage was suffered by the conveyance. 
In accordance with the view of this paper, Oliver J. opined that 
the Hedley Byrne decision established a general tort duty for 
professionals, such as solicitors, which prior to that had not existed. 
The non-existence of such a duty had been the basis of the leading 
cases which allowed liability for negligence in contract alone.
52 
Thus he was not constrained to follow them. The reiteration of a 
53 
general tort duty applying to professionals in Arenson v Ais.svn,b., 
persuaded Oliver J. not to follow the first instance 
S 
. h54 55 decisions Clark v Kirby m1t and Bagot v Stevens Scanlan & Co. 
f f . . k S . f 56 Oliver J. ound that the Court o Appeal dec1s1ons Coo v win en 
57 and Heywood v Wellers were not binding as the references to the 
contractual nature of a solicitors' liability formed no necessary part 
of their ratio decidendi. Both decisions concerned the liability 
• 
• 
of solicitors in contract for negligently caused emotional stress, 
and proceeded on the assumption that a solicitor's liability for 
16 
negligent performance of a contract was contractual only. The real 
substance of each decision, however, was more concerned with the 
extent of contractual damages allowed, and it appears here as though 
the tests for remoteness of damage in contract and tort have drawn 
58 
together making the issue of alternative causes of action in these 
cases less significant. 
Finally, and most importantly, Oliver J. felt that even if he WqS 
wrong on the previous point he was bound to follow another Court of 
59 Appeal decision Esso Petroleum Co.Ltd. v Mardon. This case dealt 
with pre-contractual misrepresentations which this paper will deal 
with later. It is enough to say here that the principles involved 
when deciding liability for damages for a misrepresentation in a 
pre-contractual situation were similar to those in the instant case 
d 1 d L d D . t h C k · b S · 60 an e or enn1ng to sate that e thought lar v K1r y m1th 
and Bagot v Stevens Scanlan & co
61 
to be in conflict with high 
authority. 
Whether Oliver J., sitting at a court of first instance, should 
have been able to decide the way he did, in view of contrary precedent 
is perhaps debatable. Nevertheless the decision realizes an overall 
consistency to the law which must be desirable. 
Oliver J. also found for the plaintiffs alternatively in contract. 
He held that the contract was not actually breached until the owner 
conveyed the property to his wife and therefore the cause of action 
did not accrue until less than six years before the trial. 
possibly more evidence of a judicial attitud~ favouring the 
This is 
elimination of differences between the consequences flowing from 
contractual and tortious negligence, which reduces the significance 
• 
• 
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f 62 o the issue being considered in this paper. 
Authority Concerning Professionals in New Zealand 
In New Zealand two cases concerning the negligent acts of architects 
63 64 in the Supreme Court both followed Bagot v Stevens Scanlan & Co 
with little further consideration of the problem. In the Court of 
Appeal decision McLaren,Maycroft & Co v Fletcher Developments
65 
it was 
stated again, solely on the basis of Bagot v Stevens,Scanlan & Co, 
that a consulting engineer could not be sued in tort if the right of 
action arose out of a cont c actual relations hip. These cases were all 
66 prior to Lord Denning's statement in Esso Petroleum Co.Ltd. v Mardon 
which has subsequently been supported by further dicta from the 
67 English Court of Appeal as well as by Midland Bank Trust Co v 
68 Hett,Stubbs & Kemp. It is probable that in the light of the 
existing English and possibly Canadian 
69 
situation in which 
professionals can be liable in tort for negligence where the right of 
action arose out of a contractual relationship, that the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal, when next dealing with the issue will reverse its 
opinion as to liability in contract only,held in McLaren,Maycroft & Co. 
70 v Fletcher Developments • However a policy factor not mentioned, 
which concerns the limitation of actions, may bear on the court's 
attitude towards the issue. If concurrent liability is accepted, 
particularly in the case of design professionals (architects, 
engineers), the action in tort may not accrue, that is, damage may not 
appear until many years after the contract's completion. Such 
professionals may even be personally liable after they have retired. 
In answer to this it has been argued that as regards buildings the 
worse the defect the sooner it is likely to be discovered, and the 
longer it remains undiscovered the less likely it is that negligence 
can be proved. There is some truth in this but design professionals 
are still faced with a potentially ruinous liability after retirement. 
• 
• 
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Negligent Mis-statement 
The tort of negligent mis-statement differs in character from the 
tort for negligent acts and has therefore to be considered separately 
in relation to the issue of concurrent liability. 
71 In Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd. the House of 
Lords enunciated the general proposition that a duty arises to take 
due care in the giving of advice or information when a party 
possessed of special skill and judgment undertakes to apply that skill 
and judgment for the benefit of another party who relies upon its 
exercise. Before Hedley Byrne the responsibility of a defendant for 
careless words, outside of a contractual duty, had traditionally been 
approached by the courts with extreme caution. Its conservative 
treatment was influenced by several factors which have been judici~lly 
noted. Reasonable persons tend to be less careful when putting 
. . . 72 views, as opposed to articles, into circulation. Words travel 
73 fast and far afield and are used without being expended. 
Judicial wariness was further encouraged by a negative attitude to 
financial loss, this being the harm usually done. The upshot of 
these factors is that the tort of negligent mis-statement as enunciated 
in Hedley Byrne and applied in later cases differs in some important 
respects from that of the tort for negligent acts. 
The first major difference is that the duty arises from a special 
r e lationship and is not derived from the foreseeauility principle 
enunciated in Donoghue v Stevenson. The Privy Council decision 
Mutual Life and Citizens Assurance Co v Evatt 74 which the New Zealand 
courts have followed,
75 
held that a special relationship arises when 
a statement, that the plaintiff is shown to have relied on, was one 
which the defendant had made in the ordinary course of his business 
or profession and that the subject matter was such that it called 
• 
• 
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for special skill or competence which the defendant laid claim to by 
way of his profession or business. If the statement was not made in 
the course of his business the defendant could still incur liability, 
if he claimed to possess a special skill comparable to those who do 
carry on the business. This sounded a partial retreat from the 
position of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne as it was there thought 
that an advisor need not necessarily possess or claim special skill to 
establish a special relationship. 
The second major difference between the tort for negligent 
mis-statements and th e loLl for negligent acts is that in the former 
76 case, although there is authority to the contrary, the governing 
view, for New Zealand at least, would appear to be that which was 
adopted by the Privy Council, that the duty of care is assumed, not 
imposed by the law. The duty is assumed by carrying on the 
profession or business in question or by holding oneself out as having 
the special skill required. The consequence of accepting that the duty 
is assumed is that an action in tort can be precluded more readily. 
Lord Reid stated in the Hedley Byrne decision: 
"The appellants founded on a number of cases in contract 
where very clear words were required to exclude the duty 
of care which would otherwise have flowed from the contract ••• 
In the case of a contract it is necessary to exclude liability 
for negligence, but in this case the question is whether an 
undertaking to assume a duty to take care can be inferred: 
and that is a very different matter." 
'11 
If the duty of care is assumed then an exclusion clause or 
disclaimer need only evidence an intention not to undertake a duty. 
The exclusion clause does not exclude the duty in tort but shows 
that it was never in fact assumed. If the duty of care is imposed 
by the law an exclusion clause must actually exclude an existing 
• 
• 
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liability for negligence in precise terms. 
If the tort duty for negligenL mis-statements is assumed,and the 
requirements in MLC v Evatt are accepted, it follows that a professional 
who enters into a contract can be said to be assuming responsibility 
in both tort and contract simultaneously. All the elements for a 
duty in tort to arise would be present. But it could be argued if 
it is accepted that the duty in tort is assumed, not imposed, that by 
entering into contractual relations the parties had evidenced an 
intention contrary to an assumption of responsibility of a duty in 
tort, preferring to found their relationship on a contractual bas.is 
only • I think that this is to deny reality, that parties would 
have no such intention. Nevertheless this justification could 
possibly be accepted, in theory, whereas with regard to negligent acts 
where the tort duty is imposed, no such justification could be 
entertained. Exclusion of liability for tortious acts must be in 
precise terms; evidence of intention alone is not enough. 
The position has been taken by some courts that the correct test 
for establishing a special relationship was that described in Hedley 
Byrne, that is, one party need not necessarily be possessed of a 
78 special skill but the relationship need only be "equivalent to contract", 
and the same courts have held that the tort duty is imposed not 
assumed therefore placing the tort for negligent mis-statements on the 
same footing as the tort for negligent acts with regard to the issue 
f 1 . b· 1 · 79 o concurrent 1a 1 1ty. This does not mean that any negligent 
mis-statement causing a breach of contract is a tort. As explained 
at the outset, to allow liability in tort a legal duty in tort must 
be present. Not any careless act or mis-statement will be 
accompanied by the requisite elements to establish a duty in tort 
although the act or mis-statement may breach the contract. For 
example, if a contract required a professional when giving advice to 
• 
• 
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pay particular attention to one aspect of the information which such 
a profession would not ordinarily call for and he failed to do so, 
such negligence would usually be contractual only. 
I shall now examine the authority concerned with concurrent 
liability for negligent mis-statements in a contractual situation. 
Nunes Diamonds Ltd. v Dominion Electric Protection Co. 80 
In the Supreme Court of Canada's decision Nunes Diamonds, 
concurrent liability for negligent mis-statement made during the 
performance of a contract was d nied by a slender majority. The 
defendant supplied, under the terms of a written contract, an alarm 
system to the plaintiff, a diamond merchant. The system was 
designed to protect the plaintiff's safe against burglaries. The 
premises of another diamond merchant using the same system were 
successfully burgled, and the plaintiff then asked the defendant to 
send someone to inspect the system. An employee of the defendant 
carried out the inspection and told the plaintiff that "even our 
engineers could not go through this system without setting an alar~'. 
The plaintiff was also sent copies of two letters written to insurance 
brokers after the burglary of the other premises • In these letters 
the defendant's general manager stated that an investigation was 
continuing, that no conclusions had been reached, that the system had 
performed its functions satisfactorily and every effort would be made 
to find an answer to the recent burglary. 
The contract between the parties merely stipulated for the supply 
of certain equipment and ~ervices at rental price. LiabLli ty for 
any "conditions, warranties or representatj ons" was negated, and 
stated the defendant was not an insuier and limited liability under 
the contract to $50 as liquidated damages. The plaintiff's safe 
was broken into and a substantial quantity of diamonds stolen by 
• 
• 
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burglars who circumvented the alarm. 
The majority decision pronounced by Pigeon J. has since been taken 
to mean, contrary to the contention of this paper, thc:1.t where there is 
a contract there can be no liability in tort for a negligent 
mis-statement if that statement was connected with the performance of 
81 
the contract. The validity of such an interpretation shall now 
be examined. 
The misrepresentations e1i.todied in the letters were made to the 
insurance brokers wI10 in turn passed them on to Nunes. 
D.E.P. did not 
in that case assume responsibility with Nunes,thus there could be no 
liability in tort for those misrepresentations. 
The second 
representations relied on were made by the employee inspecting the 
system. 
Pigeon J. applied the test for a special relationship 
enunciated in MLC v Evatt, thus only professionals or those people 
holding ±hemselves out as having special skills could be liable in 
tort. 
The representor was a serviceman not an engineer so it may be 
seriously questioned whether he had the requisite skill to give the 
advice he did and therefore assume responsibility in tort. 
It was 
partially on this basis, that Pigeon J. denied liability in tort • 
"The wording of the serviceman's stat ement shows that he 
was not an engineer. No employee other than a high 
executive or engineer could reasonably be pr~sumed to 
have knowledge of the degree of security afforded by 
82 the D.E.P. system~ 
The facts examined so far appear to show that there could be no 
liability in tort there being no legal duty. However Pigeon J. 
went further basing his judgiment on the effect of the exclusion 
clause, and as a result of this his judgement has been taken to mean 
• 
• 
that there can be no liability in tort where the duty arises out of 
a contractual relationship. Pigeon J. stated; 
"Furthermore, the basis of a tort liability considered in 
Hedley Byrne is ina~)l> licable to any case where the 
relationship between the parties is governed by a contract 
unless the negligence relied on can properly be considered 
as "an independent tort" unconnected with the performance 
of that contract as expressed in Elder Dempster v Paterson 
[1924] AC370 at 548. 1183 
The interpretation of lhis passage turns on the meaning of the 
word "governed". Does "governed" by a contract mean that by the 
mere presence of a contract a relationship is governed by that 
contract and that contract precludes liability in tort for acts 
connected with the performance of that contract? It is submitted 
that it does not. The Elder Dempster case concerned the effect of 
an exclusion clause in a bill of lading. Viscount Finlay was not 
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denying the possibility of having concurrent liability in tort and 
contract but was stating the point that an exclusion clause effectively 
worded to preclude liability for negligence applied to both tortious 
and contractual actions • That is, a negligent act done while 
performing a contract cannot incur liability in tort if it is 
covered by an effectively worded exclusion clause,"governed" by a 
contract. It is submitted that this was how Pigeon J. interpreted 
the decision. After finding ihat the negligent mis-statement was 
made in connection with the performance of the contract, Pigeon J, 
did not immediately conclude ihat there could be no liability in tort, 
which would be the case if the mere presenc e of a contract was 
sufficient to preclude tort liability, but went on to consider whether 
the contract evidenced an intention contrary to the assumption of a 
duty of care in tort. It is of vital significance that Pigeon J. 
f o llowed the decision of~ v Bratt and that therefore the duty of 
LAW LI BRARY 
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care for a negligent mis-statem nt is assumed. The contract can 
effectively"govern" the relationship by an exclusion clause that 
evidences a general intention not to assume a duty in tort and it 
need not be in precise terms which would be the case if the duty 
was imposed. Pigeon J. rightly found after considering the 
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exclusion clause that the contract had never been intended to be the 
equivalent of a contract of insurance and that D.E.P had never 
intended to assume such obligations in tort. 
"May this contract of service be considered as having been 
turned into the equivalent of a contract of insurance, by 
virtue of inaLLuLate or incomplete representations 
respecting the actual value of the protection service 
supplied? In my view,there is no doubt that this question 
should be answered in the negative. There is nothing from 
which it can properly be inferred that Nunes considered that 
the contract had been so altered and it is perfectly obvious 
that D.E.P's management never intended to assume such 
1
. . 84 ob 1gat1ons." 
The dissenting judgment followed the test enunciated in Hedley 
Byrne rather than the more restricted view in M.L.C. v Evatt • 
Thus the fact that the relationship was contractual provided sufficient 
evidence of a special relationship. Also the minority, when dealing 
with the exclusion clause, although purporting to follow Hedley Byrne, 
held that it had to be in precise terms to be effective thus implying 
the duty of care was imposed not assumed. 
TI1e Supreme Court cf Canada's decision is the only case concerning 
concurrent liability for negligent mis-statements while actually 
performing a contract known to the writer. The New Zealand courts 
appear to have accepted the Privy Council decision MLC v Evatt. 
• 
• 
Thus the majority decision in Nunes Dian1onds, ( if the writer's 
interpretation of it is correct), must provide persuasive authority 
in line with the contention of this paper. Where an independent 
legal duty in tort can be established, although arising out of a 
contractual relationship, concurrent liability can ensue. To 
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establish that independent legal duty in tort for a negligent 
mis-statement, as well as showing the representor possessed some 
special skill it must be shown that the parties assumed a duty of care. 
That assumption of duty should not be displaced by merely entering 
into a contractual relationship but care must be taken in examining 
the terms of a contract in order to ensure that those terms do not 
provide specific evidence to the effect that it was not intended that 
a duty in tort be asswned. 
Pre-contractual Misrepresentations 
The tort duty of care for negligent mis-statements is now 
frequently invoked in the pre-contractual situation. The 
contractual remedy for an innocent misrepresentation was rescission 
only. Lawyers were quick to recognize the possibility of utilizing 
the tort established in Hedley Byrne to recover damages for 
pre-contractual negligent, but innocent, misrepresentations. The 
issues involved here are almost identical to those concerning liability 
for misrepresentations made during the performance of a contract. 
However, the principle of caveat emptor has been a further factor in 
doubting the assumption of responsibility for a duty in tort in a 
pre-contractual situation. The principle of caveat emptor was said 
to be well understood by negotiating parties and therefore acted as 
an effective disclaimer. 
'" ••• a pre-contractual relationship would not normally qualify 
as a special relationship of the type which would subject one 
or other of the parties to a duty of care in the assembly 
• 
• 
or presentation of facts, figures or other information as to 
the subject matter of the contract •••• [and the policy of the 
common law to uphold contracts freely made] because a 
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person in a pre-contract negotiation is entitled to and usually 
does seek to make the most advantageous deal he can ••• [and] 
h d 1 1 h . . 85 ave regar so e y to 1s own interests." 
The underlying principle of the caveat emptor rule is that the 
onus is on the representee to check the representations. However, 
pre-contractual negotiations "are normally seriously intended, 
pertinent to the conclusion of a specific contract, and understood 
by both parties. 1186 In practice, representations are relied on 
and surely they should be. To evoke the caveat emptor principle 
is to give with one hand and take with the other. 
Australian Authority 
87 Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Downs 
The New South Wales government when inviting tenders for the 
deepening of Newcastle harbour failed to inform the plaintiffs of 
disused coal mine workings under the harbour • This resulted in 
unanticipated delays and expenses in the performance of the contract. 
The court stressed the caveat emptor principle but continued to say 
that in view of the special nature of the information withheld, a 
special relationship could have existed. On the facts it was found 
that the New South Wales government had made no assumption of 
responsibility. As well as considering the conduct and conversations 
of the parties the court placed particular emphasis on the contract 
documents which contained clauses which indicated reasonably clearly 
that the information supplied was not definitive and that a tenderer 
"must satisfy himself regarding the adequacy and accuracy of his 
information on site conditions." A decisive factor in the case may 
• 
• 
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have been that the negligence complained of was not that of a 
positive misrepresentation but that of withholding information. 88 
The general rule is that mere silence is not a misrepresentation. 
It may have been for this reason that the principle of caveat emptor 
was thought significant and that 1n the case of a positive 
misrepresentation the caveat emptor principle would warrant far less 
consideration. 
Dicta in a subsequent Australian case supported the abuve 
decision with Ji~tle further consideration of the issue. 89 
Thus 
Aust~alian law would appear to support concurrent liability in a 
pre-contractual situation where an independent legal duty in tort 
can be shown, but exactly what is necessary to show an assumptioq 
of responsibility is not clear. 
Canadian Authority 
In Canada the most recent case concerned with concurrent liability 
in a pre-contractual situation was Walter Cabott Construction Ltd 
90 
v The Queen where the Ontario Court of Appeal held that there was 
an assumption of responsibility to provide all relevant information 
when inviting tenders for a building contract. No references 
were made to the effects of the caveat emptor principle or the terms 
of the contract which could provide evidence of the parties intentions. 
The decision also omitted discussion of both the cases Nunes Diamonds, 
f f 91 . and Sealand o the Paci ic Ltd v Ocean Cement Ltd. which 
mis-interpreted the former case to mean that there could never be 
liability in tort for negligent advice related to the performance of 
a contract and so concluded that this usually applied to pre-contractual 
situations. 
• 
• 
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These few inconsistent decisions within Canadian jurisprudence 
preclude the writer from drawing any conclusions on the current 
s tatus of the law with regard to concurrent liability in pre-contractual 
situations in Canada. 
English Authority 
Essa Petroleum Co.Ltd. v Marden 
~ 
In this case the English Court of Appeal made it clear that 
concurrent liability could be admitted for pre-contractual 
misrepresentations. Marden, the plaintiff, entered into a tenancy 
of a petrol station on reliance of a statement made by a representative 
of Essa Petroleum that the throughput of the station would amount to 
two hundred thousand gallons. In fact the statement was negligently 
given and nothing like this was achieved. Essa Petroleum was held 
liable alternatively in tort for negligent misrepresentation and in 
contract for breach of warranty. Although it was said that Essa 
Petroleum's representatives were possessed of special skills when it 
came to giving advice on potential petrol consumption such a finding 
may not have been necessary to establish liability in tort following 
the court's reasoning . 
The Court of Appeal in choosing betwee n the tests proposed by 
Ile dley Byrne and MLC v Evatt d e cided in favour of the former. 
The refore a requirement of special skill was not essential to 
e stablish a special r e lationship. Th e me mb e rs of the Court of 
Appeal who were unanimous concluded that a pr e -contratual relationship 
containe d the necessary qualities to establi s h a spe cial relationship 
pa rticularly so in this insta n ~e as specjal skill was required. 
Lo rd Denning made it clear that there was no reason in logic or principle 
to hold that the presence of a contract pr e cluded a duty in tort. 
111e Court of Appeal a lso held that the duty in tort was imposed 
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therefore its exclusion could only be effected by an exclusion 
clause in precise terms and it follows that the caveat emptor principle 
was not a consideration which could preclude the tort duty. 
New Zealand courts should treat this authority with caution, 
because of its different view on the nature of the tort for negligent 
mis-statements. The issue of concurrent liability for pre-contractual 
mis-statements in the United Kingdom is now really only of academic 
interest. In 1967 the Misrepresentation Act was passed allowing 
damages in contract and removing liability in tort for negligence 
and deceit for such pre- coutractual statements. 
New Zealand Authority 
In New Zealand,provisions equivalent to the irisrepresentations Act 
are included in the Contractual Remedies Act making pre-contractual 
concurrent liability an issue of little moment. Nevertheless, as 
the general principles applied to pre-~ontractual situations are also 
applicable to contractual situations, combined with the fact that 
parties can contract out of the Act's provisions it is advis~ble that 
the relevant New Zealand authority be examined. 
Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham 93 
The plaintiff was induced to purchase a car by a salesman's 
careless representation that it had had only two owners when in fact 
it had had five owners. The plaintiff was successful in a tort 
action for negligence. Howe7er, the judg/ment covered controversial 
points in a brief fashion. The defendant did not carry on the 
business of giving advice, and did not need any particular skill or 
competence to give the advice he did. The plaintiff could have 
readily obtained the information sought by applying to the Post Office. 
Futhermore the contract contained a term to the effect that the 
purchaser had relied on his own judgtment and not on any 
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representations made to him. How could it be said that a duty in 
tort was assumed in light of the above factors? Moreover, how could 
the purchaser claim he relied on the misrepresentation when he signed 
a contract to the contrary effect? Cooke J. also acknowledged the 
principle of caveat emptor and that the authorities fell far short 
of allowing concurrent liability in all pre-contractual relationships, 
but he still managed to hold the defendant liable in tort. 
Cooke J. relied on the verbal undertaking to ascertain the number 
of owners, to show an assumption of responsibility despite the 
exclusion clause. Even if this doubtful argument is accepted it must 
still be shown that the plaintiff relied on the representation, a 
difficult task indeed considering he signed a contract to the contrary. 
The second ground for Cooke J's finding of a special relationship 
was that the salesman "had a direct financial interest." Surely in 
most pre-contractual situations, the representor would stand to gain 
financially if the contract were entered into. Perhaps this is a 
good reason for the establishment of a special relationship but it is 
difficult to square with Cooke J's earlier caution against allowing 
concurrent liability in a pre-contractual situation. It also serves 
to defeat the requirement of special skill laid down in MLC v Evatt. 
Although the financial interest factor was derived from MLC v Evatt 
it is doubtful that it was intended in the way Cooke J. interpreted it. 
94 In Presser v Caldwell Estates Pty.Ltd. the financial interest factor 
was construed to apply to fact situations similar to those in Anderson 
and Sons Ltd. v Rhodes
95 
which was also cited in MLC v Evatt. The 
defendant must not only have a financial interest but his interest must 
also qualify the defendant to make a statement because of further 
knowledge gained by his own financial transactions. 
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The prevailing view amongst the pre-contractual misrepresentation 
cases is that where an independent legal ~uty in tort can be 
established although arising out of a contractual situation there can 
be liability in tort. The caveat must be entered however, that at 
least as far as Ne,, Zealand courts are concerned, the establishment of 
such an independent legal duty depends on showing an assumption of 
responsibility. The fact that the representation is pre-contractual 
is not likely to displace this assumption of responsibility 
particularly in view of the Capital Motors Ltd v Beecham decision, 
and nor should it. Parties rely on pre-contractu/al representations 
and would surely exp~~l a reasonable standard of care to be exercised. 
Conclusion 
The paper in its introduction postulated three possible solutions 
as to when an alternative action in tort should succeed for the 
negligent breach of a contract. The third solution suggested was 
that all negligent breacl1es should incur liability in tort. 
Although there has been no authority accepting this proposition there 
is some indication that the courts are working towards such a position 
by narrowing the differences between the remedies in contract and tort 
f 
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or negligence. Be this as it may, a distinction still exists. 
Thus it is the contention of this paper that there should be liability 
both for negligent acts and negligent mis-statements in tort where the 
right of action between the parties exists jndependently although 
arising out of the contractual relationship between the parties. 
Judicial authority has in the main supported this view. However, 
a small number of cases have held that even though an independent legal 
duty in tort was established, if the act or statement complained of 
was connected with the performance of a contract then liability coula 
Le contractual only. The two leading cases suppOLting this 
proposition, whose autl1ority is now doubtful, both concerned 
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professionals whose duty in tort had only just been developed at the 
time of the decisions. It is suggested that perhaps the denial of 
concurrent liability in those cases was caused by a preoccupation 
with precedent and a failure to appreciate a changing tort doctrine. 
ncontract is a province of the law in which conceptions a r e 
much more settled than in the law of tort, and there is a 
danger of giving undue precedence to fixed ideas in the 
former when they come into contact with the latter. 1197 
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